As 2005 faded, the CIA drone campaign had yet to eliminate a senior al-Qaida commander, but patience and perseverance paid dividends. American authorities understood that al-Qaida infrastructure was compartmented into internal and external portions. Each was led by capable, yet elusive individuals. These were primary targets of the campaign in 2005, either to capture or kill. Meanwhile, al-Qaida external operators were neither complacent nor inept; and as they were hunted, they continued to perpetrate acts of terrorism. Herein we will explore the second and third drone strikes in 2005, just the third and fourth overall in Pakistan.
Following the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM) in March 2003, combined with the previous and subsequent captures of some of his chief lieutenants: Ramzi Binalshibh in September 2002, Abdulrahim al-Nashiri in November 2002, and Walid bin Attash in April 2003, the central command of al-Qaida plots and operations shifted to the community of militants based in the Shakai valley of South Waziristan in the FATA of Pakistan. Consequently, the malicious intentions of al-Qaida, KSM, and associates were viewed to be assumed by two particular individuals, unknown to the general public at the time of their reveal.
On August 18, 2004 the Pakistanis officially announced al-Qaida’s internal operations manager, Abu Faraj al-Libi as one of the country’s six most wanted, offering a bounty of 20 million rupees, or nearly $350,000, and displaying a photograph of the Libyan [1]. The remaining five most wanted in the issuance were Pakistanis affiliated with Lashkar e Jhangvi and other local Pakistani terror networks interconnected with al-Qaida [1]. Lacking a similar bounty, the external operations commander, Hamza Rabia was not listed specifically [1], but he was mentioned and identified as dangerous and of Egyptian nationality in subsequent press reports [2]. The FBI was confident enough to speak openly about the previously publicly unknown character. To the press they described the importance of the Egyptian and Abu Faraj al-Libi in terms of external operations: “There is a replacement for Mohammed (KSM) named Abu Faraj. If there is an attack on the US, his deputy, Hamza Rabia, will be responsible. He’s head of external operations for al-Qaida—an arrogant, nasty guy [3].”
Hamza Rabia was born to a reasonably wealthy family in the Egyptian city of Faiyum [4]. He was well educated and spent plenty of time in his youth with relatives in Kuwait before returning to his native lands [4]. He was but 17 when he departed for jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets, operating with the other Egyptians of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) [4]. He maintained presence in and around Jalalabad for combat, after having trained at the earliest iteration of al-Faruq camp for military matters, and continued his education in Islamic law [4]. Hamza Rabia became renown in the Egyptian jihadist community, and diligently applied himself to security protocols [4]. When the Pakistanis forced the expulsion of the mujahidin community from within their borders, Hamza Rabia subsequently departed for Yemen [4]. Therein he labored still for Ayman al-Zawahiri (chief of the EIJ), working diligently as his personal aide [4]. There he even married, before being summonsed to join al-Qaida and the rest of the jihadist infrastructure in the Sudan [4]. He eventually followed his commander to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s to dwell under the rule of the Taliban, becoming both a security specialist again for the EIJ, and a close personal confidant of Zawahiri’s [4]. His role evolved from one of preventing espionage to external operations after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion tore the Taliban stranglehold on Afghanistan asunder. Hamza Rabia fled with the rest of his comrades to Pakistan, establishing in South Waziristan, and earning the trust of bin Laden to assume such a critical function for the organization [4].
Owing to the capture of KSM, Abu Faraj traveled to the Shakai valley in September 2003 in order to establish the parameters and protocols for external operations with Hamza Rabia [5]. Considerations were given to Hamza Rabia dwelling in South Waziristan, in appointing the Egyptian to helm missions abroad [6]. His proximity to the rest of the functional al-Qaida command made the choice of Hamza Rabia to replace KSM obvious. In this capacity, Hamza Rabia assumed External Operations, with the promise of producing attacks and results where KSM had failed after 9/11 [5]. Previously, Hamza Rabia was overseeing information technology for the network, a duty he had since transferred to another operative [7]. Abu Faraj relayed to Hamza Rabia the direct desires and wishes of Zawahiri, for external operations to target India, Israel, and of course Egypt [5]. As part of providing guidance for these missions, Abu Faraj gave particular emphasis to Hamza Rabia to ensure the recruitment of Europeans, other Westerners, and free travelers who could gain entrance into nations otherwise off limits to al-Qaida [5]. These included Indians, which as the country held a massive Muslim population from which to recruit, Abu Faraj believed that they could travel with ease in order to carry out operations [5]. Hamza Rabia and the South Waziristan based al-Qaida survivors were commissioned to revitalize and restore a minimalistic al-Qaida training apparatus in the FATA for such endeavors, mimicking their camps from Afghanistan [6]. His close relationship with his fellow Egyptian and other North African operatives, such as Khalid Habib [6] (the eventual paramilitary commander of al-Qaida), ensured that his promotion was permanent.
With Hamza Rabia based in the Shakai valley with the majority of al-Qaida’s command structure, rejuvenating operational training, in the autumn of 2003, he planned and instructed operatives in an assassination attempt against Pervez Musharraf [8]. A Syrian known as Abu Bakr al-Suri provided electronics lessons and explosives training for the operatives. Approximately a dozen or so Pakistanis comprised the operatives to be utilized in the operation [8]. The Syrian, who had previously helmed the Kandahar office of the Wafa Foundation [9], was now assistant to Rabia in his endeavors [5].
Described as the first real field operation for Abu Faraj, the December 2003 suicide attack and assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi, were conducted in coordination with local militants [5,10]. Pakistani operatives were coordinated for the event by Punjabi Amjad Hussain Faruqi [6]. As mentioned, they were trained for their assault by Hamza Rabia and his men in Shakai [8]. Abu Faraj issued the orders to assassinate President Musharraf, synchronizing between the External Operations unit with Hamza Rabia and his local network of a variety of Pakistani militants and contacts, under Amjad Faruqi [6]. This also provided Abu Faraj a layer of protection, in that he was not privy to all of the details of the plots. The groundwork was to be handled by Hamza Rabia, and in Pakistan by Faruqi.
In November, Abu Faraj visited both Hamza Rabia and Abu Bakr al-Suri at their domicile being utilized as a training center and headquarters for operational plotting in Shakai [5]. In this location, Hamza Rabia conducted research and instruction on explosives, detonators, and other security related issues [5]. During the visit, the Libyan and Egyptian discussed multiple subjects but undoubtedly also prepared for the impending Musharraf assassination attempt. The two deadly December suicide bombings aimed at Musharraf failed to kill the President, but rattled his sense of security, and galvanized his resolve to disrupt and dismantle al-Qaida infrastructure within his nation [7].
By late December the fighters in Shakai began to realize that Hamza Rabia was assuredly responsible for the Musharraf operation [8]. The Egyptian began to increase his profile and was provided with an array of lieutenants and aids. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was essentially gifted to Hamza Rabia along with two others from paramilitary commander Abdulhadi al-Iraqi to assist with Rabia’s operations in late 2003 [11]. Hamza Rabia also relied on fellow Egyptian Muhsin Musa Matwali Atwah, al-Qaida’s primary explosive manufacturer, as one of his vital assets, whom he utilized for explosives instruction and construction purposes [6,12]. Finally, he gained his loyal adjutant in the wake of one of Europe’s most lethal terrorism incidents.
The aftermath of the March 2004 Madrid train bombings revealed a sense of desperation, desire, and almost jealousy from Hamza Rabia. He was intent on recreating the success of the mass transit attack and began to pour resources into the project [5,12]. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi was also impressed with the results and began to openly discuss a similar operation to be conducted in Italy [5]. That being said, he had no specifics in terms of plotting or logistics, instead just offering his thoughts to Abu Faraj to manifest [5]. But it was Hamza Rabia’s role in the organization and his determination that maintained the focus on the soft targets provided by mass transit in the West.
After the Battle of Wana in March 2004, and the Pakistani incursions into South Waziristan, some al-Qaida forces remained near Wana, while others, including Hamza Rabia and Atwah transplanted to North Waziristan, yet again reestablishing and rejuvenating the al-Qaida training and operational foundation [6].
A Moroccan connected to the North African perpetrators of the Madrid attacks subsequently was named as Hamza Rabia’s deputy in External Operations [4]. Born in 1968, he was Amir al-Azizi, also known as Abu Jaffar al-Maghrebi [4,13]. Later he was recognized by the additional alias of Abu Othman al-Andalusi [3]. Azizi was from a well off family in Casablanca and attended University there, becoming proficient in Spanish, before moving across the Mediterranean to Spain [4]. Perceiving Spanish society as an offense to his religion, he became increasingly radicalized [4]. He arrived in Spain in 1995 after a stint in Bosnia, meeting his future bride in 1996 [14]. Eventually he married the Spanish convert and began a family with her [4]. This was in 1998, and by this point she and her husband were already under state surveillance [14,15]. She was the Spaniard Raquel Burgos Garcia, whose family owned an upscale restaurant in Madrid [15]. Described as adventurous, her family did not take offense or establish concern at her conversion to Islam, and apparently missed the signs of radicalization [15]. Despite the fact that her father did not approve of her mate, they were allowed a stipend to live on while in Madrid [14,15]. The couple dwelled in an apartment provided by the wife’s Spanish family [15]. Afterwards, they migrated to Afghanistan and Azizi commenced his jihadist training and education [4]. Despite the increased attention on the couple, they were able to depart Spain without a trace [15]. Arriving in 2001 they missed a raid on their Spanish home by one month, and were now poised for a jihadist future [14]. Azizi continued to focus his attention on Spain and perpetrating operations therein with the infamous Abu Dahdah cell [4]. Azizi fled into Iran after the invasion, but was forced to return because of security sweeps, thus being enfolded into the militant apparatus in Afghanistan [4]. He worked on administrative duties for the militants before being assigned to the media committee [4]. He then participated in raids and battles within Afghanistan, leading up to his ascension into the vital external operations committee [4]. It was said that he directly participated in preparing and training potential operatives [13]. He was familiar with and trusted by the senior command of al-Qaida, to include Abulhadi al-Iraqi, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Khalid Habib, Shaikh Said al-Masri, and of course Hamza Rabia [13].
From there he became the adjutant to Hamza Rabia, being appointed to the position before the Madrid attacks of March 2004 [13]. It is assessed that Azizi was in some form of communication with the local network which perpetrated the attacks, both before and after his promotion [13].
In May 2004, Abu Faraj and Hamza Rabia met with a Somalian al-Qaida contact about operational capabilities of East African members under the command of al-Qaida operative Harun Fazul [16]. Abu Faraj encumbered the operative with letters of instruction for Fazul and the network in Mogadishu, further displaying how Abu Faraj and Hamza Rabia were fully in control of al-Qaida operations worldwide [16].
Yet the senior operatives faced increasing risks. Pakistani authorities disrupted the plots of Hamza Rabia via raiding a safehouse associated with and utilized by the Egyptian on July 24, 2004 in Gujrat, located in Punjab province of Pakistan and capturing his aide Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani [17,18,19]. The Tanzanian used the safehouse as an office, where Hamza Rabia had coalesced all of his important documents and equipment as a staging ground prior to transplanting them to safety elsewhere [17]. Hamza Rabia narrowly avoided capture in the event, as he had just previously visited the location [17].
Despite the hindrances of the previous summer, during the course of 2005, al-Qaida’s external operations component succeeded in perpetrating another attack composed of simultaneous bombings in a major Western municipality. It was to be years after the bombings before the press and public accepted that al-Qaida was directly responsible for the atrocities, with initial speculation being that local and independent radicals were the culprits instead [20,21]. Just shy of four years since 9/11, and supposedly decimated by the American invasion, al-Qaida conducted a sizeable assault on London, directed from their base in the FATA. Hamza Rabia surrounded himself with capable lieutenants, and assigned his Egyptian counterpart Abu Ubaidah al-Masri to oversee preparations and the conducting of the mission [12,22]. Attacking transit was now an obsession for Hamza Rabia after the success of the Madrid operation [5]. Originally a paramilitary officer [17], after the arrest of KSM and the ascension of Hamza Rabia to External operations chief, Abu Ubaidah appears to have been recruited for operational responsibilities [22,23]. He then interacted and worked closely with Hamza Rabia and Abu Faraj al-Libi [5].
For the success of the mission, Abu Ubaidah relied on a British citizen of Pakistani descent: Rashid Rauf [21,24]. The plot revolved around backpack bombs containing hydrogen peroxide powder explosives, as apparently developed by Atwah [12]. Ubaidah oversaw the plot for Hamza Rabia, while Rauf acted as the liaison between al-Qaida leadership and the team on the ground conducting the operation [24].
Utilizing a variety of British contacts, some from a similar operation in 2004 which never materialized, Rauf came across two willing participants: Mohamed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, both also British citizens of Pakistani descent [21,24]. They arrived in Pakistan in November 2004, Rauf corralled and vetted them prior to commencing them on their path of destruction [21,24]. Rauf introduced the two to Abu Ubaidah and they entered into more advanced explosives training in the FATA [24]. Abu Ubaidah convinced the men to carry out their attacks in England, and left it to Rauf to oversee them with the logistics needed and training required [24]. After extensive preparation and training, Siddique Khan and Tanweer departed for London in February 2005 [21,24].
Once in the target city, Siddique Khan and Tanweer brought the Jamaican Germaine Lindsay and Pakistani Briton Hasib Hussain into their crew [21]. On behalf of al-Qaida and Hamza Rabia, Rauf guided Siddique Khan and his men to their successful martyrdom on July 7, 2005, killing 52 across four suicide bombings targeting three trains and one double-decker bus [21].
After the success of the first round of London attacks, Hamza Rabia acquired new recruits including one of vital European nationality, the Austrian Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain, quickly selected by the external commander for higher ambitions [12]. In September, Hussain was isolated from his class in North Waziristan and dispatched to Atwah for advanced instruction [12]. Referring to Hussain as Imran, Hamza Rabia built a cell around the Austrian and prepared them for potential missions [12]. However, unbeknownst to all involved, the CIA drone campaign was to achieve major success late in 2005 and disrupt Hamza Rabia’s machinations permanently.
On November 5, 2005, in North Waziristan, Hamza Rabia was targeted for death in a CIA drone strike [25]. The attack occurred in Masoki, some 20 miles east of Miranshah, North Waziristan [26]. According to Pakistani authorities, the blast was assessed as an accidental explosion due to incorrect explosives assembly [26]. This was nothing more than an attempt to obfuscate the truth, and was to be repeated as a cover for drone munitions. In fact, the strike was conducted with explicit approval from Pakistan [27]. Initially, an estimated eight were killed, including the militants supposedly manufacturing the explosive devices, plus a woman and at least three children, all girls [26]. According to locals, the targeted mudwalled compound was being rented by Arabs [26]. The Americans took their shot with just the third ever CIA drone strike in the FATA, aiming to disarm al-Qaida via the elimination of its external operations commander. Hamza Rabia survived and escaped [25]. However, he was wounded, and his wife and five children were killed in the incident [4].
Hamza Rabia’s escape from fate startled his men as well, leaving the Austrian Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain, very concerned. Yet the young operative took solace in the fact that Rabia survived, and his superior’s broken leg gave the man another badge in his war against the West. Now he was viewed as a survivor, an almost impenetrable wall protecting his jihadis [12].
In reality, Hamza Rabia was now feeling rushed. The Americans had nearly assassinated him, and now his first course of action was to push ahead with his plots. Pakistani officials described Hamza Rabia as in a constant state of chase, being pursued by American and Pakistani authorities relentlessly as he was ferried to various locations along the tribal border [28]. This meant that he was all but compelled into mobilizing the Austrian and two British operatives under his command. He dispatched Abu Ubaidah al-Masri to oversee the preparations that would never come to fruition.
At 0145 on the morning of December 1, Hamza Rabia was with four of his companions in Asoray, near Miranshah, North Waziristan, when his residence detonated [28]. It was an abandoned domicile, being used by the al-Qaida official for shelter while on the lam [29]. Although initially claimed as an explosion resulting from the mishandling of bombs in a state of manufacture, Pakistani authorities rapidly and quietly admitted to the incident being the work of a Predator drone strike [28]. Again, Pakistani authorities approved of the strike prior to its launch [27]. They could not however, fully acknowledge the CIA strike, as the implications of the breach of sovereignty could have negative domestic repercussions [28]. For an estimated eight minutes the drone fired onto the structure, ensuring the demise of Hamza Rabia [29]. As first reported by Dawn, locals observed six explosions at the structure [30]. Locals later scoured the ruins of the mudwalled compound searching for debris and the deceased [31]. Militants appeared after the destruction, claiming the corpses from helpful locals attempting to retrieve remains, and vanished with their comrades, thus robbing the Pakistanis of the ability to absolutely confirm the deaths [29]. Witnesses claimed that one of the men in the home had arrived just the day prior [28]. Other reports stated that all five travelers were newly arrived [29]. Nonetheless, locals were aware that one of the Arabs operated under the name Nawab, which was a known alias of Hamza Rabia [30]. Two of the Egyptian’s companions were Arabs also [28].
As mentioned, authorities from both nations were intent on neutralizing the threat presented by the Egyptian. For President Musharraf and the Pakistanis, this was retaliation for his role in the December 2003 assassination attempts. For the Americans, this was preventative in nature, due to Hamza Rabia’s helming of external operations. Press reports at the time acknowledged this duty for Hamza Rabia, but stated that he had assumed responsibilities from Abu Faraj al-Libi after the latter’s capture [28]. As discussed, this is not entirely correct. While the Libyan oversaw all al-Qaida operations in his managerial position, his focus was internal and logistical matters to run the organization, while the Egyptian conducted external missions. Other reports and surprisingly, Pakistani officials, correctly inferred the hierarchy here and noted with surprise that Abu Faraj was attributed with external planning, considering that he had not directly overseen operations outside of the Khorasan [25]. Some sources reacted with incredulity that another supposed number 3 ranking al-Qaida official was slain [29].
American authorities refused to acknowledge the report, with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley refusing to admit to a strike [28,31]. Meanwhile, President Musharraf readily agreed to proclaim the death of Hamza Rabia [28]. Assuredly this was to assuage fears and concerns about his government’s noncompliance in the search for al-Qaida and the eradication of militant extremists in the region [28]. The Pakistanis also attempted to course correct and claimed that DNA analysis was utilized to confirm the death, although this was an obvious falsehood [32]. Additionally, they denied the presence of a Predator drone or missile strike, instead attributing again the detonation to an accident during bomb assembly; even while senior Pakistani officials continued to spread the truth of the drone strike [32].
Supposed al-Qaida insiders contacted al-Arabiya network and asserted that the report was a falsity and that Hamza Rabia was alive [33]. Instead, they claimed that locals, two Tajiks, and an Arab called Abu Sulaiman al-Maghrebi were slain [33]. Pakistani government officials disagreed. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao assured the media that Hamza Rabia was eliminated [33]. From Kuwait, President Musharraf upped his assessment to 500% certain that the Egyptian had perished in the strike [33]. In fact, Hamza Rabia was dead, later eulogized by an extensive project overseen by al-Qaida official Abu Ubaidah al-Filistini, known as Martyrs in a Time of Alienation [4]. His adjutant and companion, Amir al-Azizi, having promoted to his position and having been connected to the Madrid bombers, perished along with him as one of the other Arabs [4,13]. This was fortuitous as the Americans were able to neutralize two higher ranking external operators at once. Although rumors persisted of Azizi’s death in the strike, it was not initially reported, only being revealed later in the eulogies and online statements [4,15]. A photograph of his corpse also appears in the aforementioned eulogy project [4]. Interestingly, Azizi’s wife, the Spaniard Raquel Burgos Garcia, known as Hamane, went mysteriously missing after the strike [15]. Despite rampant speculation, it was later confirmed that Raquel died alongside her husband and his commander in the abandoned home [14]. The other Arab mentioned as slain, is perhaps Abu Sulaiman al-Maghrebi. However, this could either be a name given by al-Qaida of someone that did actually die in order to give credence to their denial, or simply an attempt to lie to cover the demise of the senior. It is worth noting that there is no Abu Sulaiman al-Maghrebi mentioned in the series of eulogies [4]. Another source claims that the son of respected militant Abu Akasha al-Iraqi, based in North Waziristan, was killed in the strike while working with Hamza Rabia [34].
Internal al-Qaida communications, referring to Hamza Rabia as Nawab, lamented his obstinance in ignoring warnings and declining to depart Mir Ali, North Waziristan [35]. The communique also insinuates that Hamza Rabia’s entourage had been infiltrated, and that his inclusiveness with various militants led to espionage and his assassination [35]. Perhaps his eagerness to perpetrate further crimes exposed him to one too many militants, one of whom may have been a spy.
Pakistani attempts to account for the explosion via the explanation of mishandled explosives were exposed as fraudulent by locals that shared with the press shrapnel bearing English writing and the designator AGM-114 of a Hellfire missile [31]. Local reporter Hayatullah Khan shared the image of the damning shrapnel with NBC and thus to the world [31]. By December 5, the American press was actively focusing on the contradictory claims by the Pakistanis, thus embarrassing the security apparatus of the nation [36]. As for Hayatullah Khan, he was abducted on the same day, December 5 from North Waziristan, according to his family [37]. Pakistani officials in January placed blame on Islamic extremists, but Khan’s family was convinced that it was a reprisal abduction as conducted by the Pakistani intelligence services [37]. Hayatullah Khan was found recently deceased several months later in June 2006, outside of Mir Ali, North Waziristan, handcuffed and executed via gunshot to the back [37]. The message was clear to the local press: do not contradict the government’s cover stories. The Pakistanis were benefiting from the nascent CIA drone strike program, but they could not afford to be observed as allowing the Americans to invade or conduct airstrikes on their territory.
Upon Hamza Rabia’s death, there was international skepticism as to his actual importance, owing to the fact that he appeared on no most wanted lists and was not mentioned often in the press prior to his death [38]. Some postulated that the Americans and Pakistanis were simply overhyping the assassination of a minor al-Qaida figure [38]. Yet as can be seen from his history, Hamza Rabia was a senior, lethal, and committed jihadist. Abu Ubaidah al-Masri took over External operations, having fully transitioned from weapons instructor and battlefield commander, to international terrorist coordinator [22,23]. As can be seen, the death of Hamza Rabia removed the external operations commander, a mere seven months since the capture of al-Qaida internal operations manager Abu Faraj al-Libi. A prominent lieutenant in his cadre was also slain. But the door was opened for another, perhaps more efficient external operations commander. The drone strikes were proved to be effective against al-Qaida hierarchy, but the consequences of Pakistan attempting to cover up the story and prevent dissent were dire, as is demonstrated by the case of Hayatullah Khan. The next strike would aim higher, but also have severe ramifications.
CITATIONS:
- [1] Pakistan asks public’s help in capturing terror suspects, The Associated Press, August 19, 2004, www2.ljworld.com/news/2004/aug/19/pakistan_asks_publics/
- [2] Pakistan Trumpets Qaeda Arrests, by Matthew Pennington, CBS News, August 12, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-trumpets-qaeda-arrests/
- [3] The Terror Web, by Lawrence Wright, The New Yorker, July 25, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/08/02/the-terror-web
- [4] Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008
- [5] Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, ISN 10017, Abu Faraj al-Libi
- [6] Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, December 30, 2008, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, Issue 9
- [7] In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006
- [8] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012
- [9] Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, ISN 243, Abdullah Ali Naif al-Muqait al-Otaibi
- [10] After They Failed To Assassinate Musharraf, by Amir Mir, The Herald, January 2004 Issue, http://www.herald.dawn.com/news/1153914/after-they-failed-to-assassinate-musharraf
- [11] Charge Sheet for Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, February 2014
- [12] Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012
- [13] The Evidence of Al-Qa`ida’s Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack, by Fernando Reinares, CTC Sentinel, March 2012, Vol. 5, Issue 3
- [14] Case study of Raquel Burgos Garcia, Naming the Dead Project, Airwars.org, http://www.airwars.org/wp-content/themes/airwars-new/archives/bij-drone-war/namingthedead/people/nd15/index-lang=en.html
- [15] On the trail of Raquel, by Jose Maria Irujo, El Pais English, December 26, 2013, http://www.english.elpais.com/elpais/2013/12/26/inenglish/1388066811_506404.html
- [16] Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, ISN 10023, Hassan Ahmed Gouled
- [17] Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004
- [18] Pakistan sniffs out trail of al-Qaida, by Paul Haven, The Associated Press, August 7, 2004, http://www.poconorecord.com/story/news/2004/08/07/pakistan-sniffs-out-trail-al/51060239007/
- [19] Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, ISN 10012, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani
- [20] Al-Qa`ida’s Involvement in Britain’s “Homegrown” Terrorist Plots, by James Brandon, March 2009, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 3
- [21] Documents give new details on al Qaeda’s London bombings, by Nic Robertson, Paul CruickshankandTim Lister, CNN, April 30, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/index.html
- [22] Alleged al-Qaeda Chief Dead, Officials Say, by Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-masri10apr10-story.html
- [23] Who is Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Why Should We Care: An Obituary, by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SITE Intelligence
- [24] A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7
- [25] Al Qaeda No.3?, by B. Raman, Outlook India, December 7, 2005, http://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/al-qaeda-no3-news-229464
- [26] Accidental blast while assembling bombs kills eight, Gulf News via The Associated Press, November 6, 2005, http://www.gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/accidental-blast-while-assembling-bombs-kills-eight-1.443552
- [27] The Unblinking Stare, by Steve Coll, November 17, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare
- [28] Blast in Pakistan Kills Al Qaeda Commander, by Craig Whitlock and Kamran Khan, The Washington Post, December 4, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301473_pf.html
- [29] Drone said to have killed Al Qaeda’s No. 3, by Gretchen Peters, The Christian Science Monitor, December 5, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1205/p04s02-wosc.html
- [30] Senior al-Qaeda Commander Killed, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, December 3, 2005, http://www.dawn.com/news/168309/senior-al-qaeda-commander-killed
- [31] Evidence suggests U.S. missile used in strike, NBC News, December 2, 2005, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna10303175
- [32] Pakistan: U.S. Involvement Denied In Death Of Al-Qaeda Commander, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 4, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/a/1063497.html
- [33] Foreigners still in Waziristan, says Minister, Dawn, December 5, 2005, http://www.dawn.com/news/168566/foreigners-still-in-waziristan-says-minister
- [34] US double blow kills 21 in Waziristan, Dawn, November 1, 2008, http://www.dawn.com/news/426409/us-double-blow-kills-21-in-waziristan
- [35] Al-Qaida Internal Communique entitled “Lessons Learned Following The Fall of the Islamic Emirate”
- [36] Questions raised in Pakistan attack, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, December 5, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/05/world/asia/questions-raised-in-pakistan-attack.html
- [37] Pakistani journalist found shot dead, Al-Jazeera, June 16, 2006, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/6/16/pakistani-journalist-found-shot-dead
- [38] Al-Qaida’s Quiet Man: Hamza Rabia emerges from shadows only after his apparent death, by Paul Haven, The Associated Press, December 6, 2005, http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051206/NEWS/312069976&cid=sitesearch
© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley
